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Abstract: This paper investigates whether an expectations gap exists in the control, 
strategic and resource provision roles that independent directors play in the corporate 
governance of listed Chinese firms and the factors that affect their performance of 
these roles. For this purpose, we interviewed Chinese executive directors, independent 
directors, institutional investors, and stock exchange regulators. We find a 
performance gap, but no reasonableness gap with respect to the control and strategic 
roles. The results suggest that the performance gap may be attributed to such factors 
as the ill-defined roles, independent directors’ limited amount of time commitment 
and their lack of competence and objectivity. Interestingly, there is disagreement over 
the protection of minority interest as the objective of the control role. We find no 
consensus on the desirability, reasonableness and effectiveness of independent 
directors’ resource provision role, perhaps because of a pejorative interpretation of 
this role as an exercise of Guanxi.   
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1. Introduction 
Theories suggest that independent directors (IDs)1  can play three corporate 
governance roles: control, strategy and resource provision. This paper investigates the 
desirability, reasonableness and effectiveness of these roles and the factors that affect 
the performance of the roles. Specifically, we attempt to address the following 
research questions:  
RQ1. What roles should IDs be expected to play?  
RQ2. Under the current circumstances, is it reasonable to expect IDs to fulfil those 
roles?   
RQ3. Do IDs play their reasonable roles effectively?   
RQ4. What factors facilitate or impede IDs in the execution of their roles? 
Answering these questions enables us to assess whether an expectations gap exists 
and if so, what factors contribute to it. Given that IDs have been designed as a formal 
corporate governance mechanism, it is important to identify expectations gaps relating 
to their roles and find remedies to address them. The frequent occurrence of large 
corporate failures in recent years suggests the ineffectiveness of IDs. This fact 
reinforces the importance of answering our research questions.  
                                               
1
 The term ‘non-executive’ directors (NEDs) is commonly used in the UK in comparison to ‘outside’ 
and ‘independent’ directors used in the US and China respectively. For consistency, we use the term 
‘independent directors’.
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Many studies have examined the relationship between characteristics of IDs 
and corporate financial performance. This literature assumes that IDs help improve 
financial performance, but it has produced mixed results (e.g., Pearce and Zahra, 1991; 
Ezzamel and Watson, 1993; Peng, 2004; Firth et al., 2006). A finding of no 
performance effect may be used to indicate the existence of a performance gap, but 
such research findings are uninformative for our purposes as they do not pinpoint 
which roles of IDs are unfulfilled, and how and why they are unfulfilled. As a result, 
if there were a performance gap, they would be unable to reveal its nature and how it 
could be addressed.  
This suggests a genuine need for directly examining the desirability, 
reasonableness and effectiveness of IDs’ roles. Unfortunately, we can only identify a 
few prior studies. Reay (2004) reports that only 41 percent of British institutional 
investors consider IDs to play an effective watchdog role while all of them consider 
this role to be important. However, he reports no information on other roles played by 
IDs or the perceptions of other parties (e.g., IDs). Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 
(2004) undertake a survey of over 1,000 IDs, employee representatives and 
institutional investors in the Netherlands. They find no gaps on the division of duties 
between executives and IDs. However, they find expectations gaps on stakeholders’ 
satisfaction with the current functioning of IDs, their roles concerning directors’ 
remunerations and the interests they should serve. While these two pioneering studies 
provide some interesting insights, they do not distinguish reasonableness gap 
(between what IDs are expected to achieve and what they can be reasonably expected 
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to achieve) from performance gap (between what IDs can be reasonably expected to 
achieve and perceived actual achievements). Therefore, the implications of their 
findings are ambiguous. Brennan (2006) does distinguish reasonableness gap from 
performance gap and identifies the contributing factors, but the research concerns 
board directors in general, rather than IDs and is based on a literature review only. 
Moreover, as all these studies focus on developed countries, it remains to be evaluated 
whether their findings are applicable to transitional economies. In short, the literature 
on expectations gaps with regard to IDs’ roles is extremely underdeveloped.  
 Our study thus is intended to complement the above studies of IDs’ performance 
effects, and to enrich the literature that directly investigates expectations gaps relating 
to IDs’ roles.2 Unlike prior studies that focus on developed economies, we address 
our research questions in the context of China. As China has become one of the 
largest economies and recipients of foreign direct investments in the world, it is 
important to understand how its corporations are governed and how investors’ stakes 
are protected. China has adopted a gradual and experimental approach to political and 
economic reform and thus is apparently different not only from developed economies, 
but also from other ‘transition’ economies which adopted a “Big Bang” reform 
approach. This gives its corporate governance system quite specific and complex 
                                               
2
 In addition, our topic has not been directly addressed by, although it closely relates to, two groups of 
previous studies published in the British Journal of Management：(1) the role of IDs in improving board 
effectiveness (e.g., Roberts et al., 2005; Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009) and (2) the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms in China, e.g., Xiao et al. (2004) on Supervisory Boards and Yuan et 
al. (2009) on financial institutions. 
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characteristics. While the available evidence on the performance effects of IDs is 
limited and mixed, numerous large corporate scandals have been exposed implying 
that IDs have played a limited role (Chen et al., 2010).  
We undertook personal interviews with IDs, executive directors (EDs), 
institutional investors (IIs) and stock exchange regulators (RLs) in China. From these 
interviews, we find that control and strategic roles are recognized as desirable by all 
four groups, and there may be a performance gap, but no reasonableness gap, in the 
two roles. We also discover that the desirability, reasonableness and effectiveness of 
IDs’ resource provision role are indeterminate, largely because the role is interpreted 
in a pejorative sense (i.e., the exercise of ‘Guanxi’).  
We believe our study is the first to make such discoveries in the Chinese 
context. Moreover, unlike prior studies, our findings have greater clarity because they 
are related to specific roles (the control, strategic and resource roles) IDs play and 
specific types of expectations gap (a reasonableness gap or a performance gap). As a 
result, our findings can potentially be used to generate more specific policy and 
research implications.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 critically 
reviews theories and empirical studies of the roles of IDs. Section 3 introduces the 
background of Chinese corporate governance and China-related studies. Section 4 
discusses our research methods. Section 5 focuses on data analysis. Section 6 
concludes.  
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2. Theory and Literature   
To provide a basis on which to assess their desirability, reasonableness and 
effectiveness, this section presents a critical review of the main theoretical origins of 
the three roles ascribed to IDs and their empirical underpinnings.  
2.1 The control role  
Agency theory is the main theoretical source for the control role. Its 
proponents expect corporate boards to act as a control mechanism to reduce the 
potential divergence of interests between management and shareholders (the Type I 
agency problem) (Fama, 1980) and the conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Type II agency problem) (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Due to 
their supposed independence and objectivity, IDs are expected to help render the 
board’s control more effective by providing an important check and balance to the 
power of the executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1984) and by 
constraining large shareholders from expropriating minority shareholders (Johnson et 
al., 1996).  
However, empirical evidence on the desirability and effectiveness of IDs’ 
control role are mixed. Much research relies on the proportion of IDs as an indicator 
of board independence, and has focused on the link between board composition and 
financial performance. Some of these studies report a positive relationship between 
them(e.g., Ezzamel and Watson, 1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1991), while others find no 
such relationship (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Dalton and Daily, 1998).  
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The ambiguity of the existing evidence raises the question of whether this role 
has been overemphasised (Daily et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 2005) and serves as a call 
for further study of the desirability of ID’s control role and inner-workings. 
2.2 The strategic role  
Agency, stewardship and resource dependence theories agree on the boards’ 
strategic role although each has a particular emphasis. Agency theory pays specific 
attention to the board’s involvement in and contribution to the development of the 
firm’s strategy and the effective control of the chosen strategy (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). By comparison, stewardship theory contends that the strategic role contributes 
to the board’s stewardship and resource based theory takes the view that larger and 
more diversified boards strengthen the links between the organization and its 
environment as well as securing critical resources such as prestige and legitimacy 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001).  
There is little empirical evidence on IDs’ strategic role. Nevertheless, 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001) find that outside directors with network ties to 
strategically related companies contribute positively to the strategic decision making 
process. In contrast, Chen et al. (2009) find that Austrailian boards with more outside 
directors are not associated with corporate decisions on product and/or geographic 
diversification.  
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2.3 The resource provision role 
The desirability of a resource provision role is mainly supported by resource 
dependence theory which argues that the directors’ role, particularly that of IDs, is 
regarded as providing access to scarce resources such as external finance or other 
critical resources (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994; Hillman et al., 2000), information on 
competitors and industry (Lang and Lockhart, 1990), advice/counsel to management 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995) and enhanced reputation/legitimacy (Daily and Schwenk, 
1996). However, while empirical evidence supports the argument that board 
composition reflects the external environment of a company and that companies bring 
in more resource–rich IDs to their boards when the level of uncertainty in the external 
environment is higher (Hillman et al., 2000), some commentators claim that such a 
role remains unmeasured and unverified (Donaldson, 1995). 
In summary, even though IDs are theoretically expected to play control, 
strategic and resource provision roles, empirical studies present mixed results on their 
effectiveness. Furthermore, we know little about whether an overall consensus exists 
regarding IDs’ roles amongst the relevant parties (e.g., IDs, EDs, IIs and regulators).  
3. Corporate governance and the role of IDs in China 
In the early 1990s, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were established. An 
unusual characteristic of the Chinese stock markets was that about 90 percent of the 
companies were restructured state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and that the state owned 
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about two-thirds of their shares (Qiang, 2003).3 This has generated a conflict between 
the government, pursuing non-economic objectives, and private investors, intending 
to maximise their returns (Chen and Lin, 2007).  
In China, corporate control of a listed company is used as a means of raising 
external funds (Cai and Chen, 2004) while in a mature capital market it is often seen 
as an ultimate means of mitigating agency problems. Moreover, legal protection of 
private shareholders is weak (Lu, 2009). The quality of the law and the effectiveness 
of law enforcement in China is below the average for ‘transition’ economies (Pistor 
and Xu, 2005). Law enforcement is ineffective because courts have restricted investor 
law suits and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has contradictory 
objectives of fostering the development of a capital market while protecting ailing 
SOEs (Clarke, 2003). Furthermore, external auditing in China is improving but still 
weak because domestic audit firms only emerged in the 1980s and lack independence 
from government while international audit firms do not provide higher quality audits 
than domestic ones because of low legal risk in China (Liu and Zhou, 2007). 
In the absence of effective external mechanisms, internal mechanisms become 
particularly important for shareholders to monitor corporate activities. Under Chinese 
Corporate Law, all listed companies have a two-tier board structure where the BoD is 
regarded as a ‘decision-making’ unit and the Supervisory Board (SB) as a mechanism 
                                               
3
 State-controlled shares used to be untradable, but the CSRC launched a reform to enable all shares to 
be publicly tradable in April 2005 (for more details, see Wei and Xiao, 2009).  
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that monitors the activities of the BoDs. The appointment of IDs in listed companies 
only became a legal requirement when Corporate Law was revised in 2005. However, 
before this requirement, the CSRC had formally introduced IDs to the BoDs by 
stipulating the Code of Corporate Governance (CSRC, 2002) and the Guidelines for 
Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors (CSRC, 2001). The Code 
refers to the duties of IDs generally as “good faith and due diligence towards the 
listed company and all the shareholders”, but specifically states that IDs “shall be 
especially concerned with preventing the interests of minority shareholders from 
being infringed” (CSRC, 2002: Chapter 3 (5) 50). The Code also requires IDs to chair 
the board’s sub–committees and monitor EDs and the board procedures. Meanwhile 
the Guidelines requires IDs to express their opinions on such material events as 
appointment/replacement of directors and senior managers and debt finance that 
exceeds RMB ￥3 million or 5 percent of the company’s net assets. In addition, IDs 
are awarded “special powers”: (i) to approve major related party transactions before 
BoD discussion, (ii) to propose to the board to call interim shareholders’ and board 
meetings and (iii) to propose the appointment or removal of the company’s auditors.  
The acknowledged ineffectiveness of the SB’s monitoring role (e.g., Xiao et al., 
2004; Li and Tang, 2009) has led to a high expectation of IDs’ roles in corporate 
governance. However, it remains unclear whether Chinese IDs can play, or actually 
play, their defined roles effectively. Some studies provide positive evidence. For 
instance, Peng (2004) finds that IDs improves sales growth but not return on equity. 
More recently, Chen and Lin (2007) find a smaller proportion of IDs in firms 
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experiencing frauds than in non-fraud firms. Several studies suggest that resource 
dependence may have a heightened role for IDs because of the Chinese cultural 
propensity to rely on relationships (guanxi) (Peng, 2003, and 2004; Au et al., 2000; 
Park and Luo, 2001). In contrast, other studies question the effectiveness of IDs. Liu 
and Lu (2004) find that some IDs were friends of EDs and given the prevalent guanxi 
culture, it is difficult for IDs to vote against their ED friends. The eruption of a series 
of highly publicised corporate scandals supports these observations (Chen et al., 
2010). 
4.  Research methods 
We planned to interview ten EDs and ten IDs from ten listed firms, ten IIs who 
held ownership shares of listed firms and RLs (officials at the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Stock Exchanges). These groups were chosen to enable us to compare the opinions of 
EDs versus IDs, and outsiders (IIs, regulators) versus insiders (IDs and EDs).  
We chose to use in-depth interviews, rather than a questionnaire survey, as they 
would allow us to probe into sensitive issues and gain deep and rich insights. Also, 
the participants could elaborate and clarify ambiguous responses while maintaining 
the focus of the discussion on key issues (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). More 
importantly, EDs and IDs were unlikely to complete questionnaires on sensitive 
issues. 
We considered the following factors in selecting the sample companies and 
interviewees. First and foremost was accessibility. This proved very difficult but our 
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personal and professional contacts in China provided a pool of potential companies 
we could access. Second, we selected companies from different regions and industries, 
and of different listing age and size, to obtain balanced views. Hence, our sample 
companies were drawn from Beijing (North China, the political centre), Shanghai 
(Southeast China, a financial and commercial centre), Guangdong (South, a 
manufacturing centre) and Hunan (Central China, relatively less developed). They 
represented firms in IT, manufacturing, pharmaceutical, transport, real estate and 
commercial industries. Their sizes (total assets) ranged from RMB ￥1 billion to over 
RMB ￥40 billion. Their listing ages also varied from seven to over 17 years. Third, 
to increase the richness, variety and reliability of the interviews, we obtained nine 
pairs of IDs and EDs from nine companies. Fourth, our interviewees had different 
backgrounds. The IDs represented three of the most popular sources: accounting/tax 
professionals or professors, industry specialists and senior managers of other 
companies; the EDs included CEOs, Deputy CEOs and a Company Secretary; and IIs 
were drawn from securities companies, funds and investment consulting companies.  
A combination of the above factors led us to conduct a total of 30 interviews 
during July-August 2006 and June-July 2007. These included interviews with ten IDs, 
ten EDs, eight IIs and two stock exchange officials (see Table 1). Despite our effort to 
take into various factors into consideration, our sample was essentially a convenience, 
rather than a random sample. It is considered difficult to generalise statistical findings 
from a convenience sample to the population because the results may be biased. For 
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example, one noticeable bias in our sample was the absence of lawyer IDs.4 However, 
most behavioural and social science studies use convenience samples and they are 
considered particularly appropriate and useful in case of an explorative study and 
when it is impractical to obtain a random sample (Herek, 2010; Randall and Gibson, 
1990). Our study is explorative as little prior study has been done and it was 
extremely difficult to obtain a random sample of interviewees because of the access 
problem. The weaknesses of the convenience sample hopefully are more than 
compensated by the richness and depth of our interview data. 
======================= 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
======================== 
We failed to gain access to an ED in Company 5 and an ID in Company 11, so 
the data from the interviews with ID5 and ED11 has been removed from data analysis. 
We stopped interviewing more IIs after we had done eight of them, because saturation 
had already become evident (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
Prior to the interviews, we developed a list of semi-structured questions 
related to all three theoretical roles and our four research questions, as shown in 
Appendix 1. These were used to guide the interview process and to maintain broad 
consistencies between interviews. The meaning of each concept was discussed with 
                                               
4
 We did try hard, but failed to arrange an interview with a lawyer ID, after several postponements by 
him.  
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the interviewees at the beginning of the interviews. Our literature review reveals that 
the ID’s roles are multi-dimensional. For example, IDs’ expertise contributing to 
strategic decision-making involves strategic and resource roles. Huse (2005) defines 
the IDs’ roles as control and service, and includes behaviour, output and strategic 
control in the former, and advice, networking, communication and strategic 
participation in the latter. This model is further developed by Minichilli et al. (2009). 
The present study applies Huse’s model regarding the control role, but focuses the 
strategic role on strategic participation, including provision of advice on strategic 
issues while focusing the resource provision role on networking, communication and 
other resource-based services. This classification was consistently used throughout the 
interviews and has been applied in our data analysis. 
In order to obtain a quantitative measure of whether there is a reasonableness 
or performance gap with respect to a corporate governance role, the interviewees were 
asked to score on whether the role is considered to be reasonable or effective using a 
five point scale (1=very unreasonable/very ineffective, 2=unreasonable/ineffective, 
3=neutral, 4=reasonable/effective, 5=very reasonable/very effective). 
Most interviews were conducted face to face, except that one ID and one 
regulator were interviewed by phone. Each interview lasted about one hour and was 
recorded, except for one II and two IDs who rejected recording, but allowed us to take 
notes. The interviews were transcribed in Chinese and then translated into English. A 
seven-stage approach, suggested by Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), was adopted to sift 
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through and process the interview data: case familiarisation, reflection on contents, 
conceptualisation, cataloguing of concepts, recoding, linking, and re-evaluation. 
During these stages the responses were analysed to identify common themes which 
were then compared to the researchers’ own prior expectations and extant literature. 
The approach is iterative in that data and analysis were revisited on several occasions 
over an extended period of time. 
5. Data Analysis  
A summary of the views of EDs, IDs and IIs on the three roles are shown in 
Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Integrating the concept of expectations gap, 
introduced in Section 1, and the research questions, a seven-scenario data analysis 
framework is developed as shown in Fig.1. A reasonableness gap exists when a role is 
identified as desirable (yes to RQ1), but it is not reasonable to expect an ID to play 
such a role under current circumstances (no to RQ2), shown as scenario 2 (S2). A 
performance gap is identified when it is reasonable to expect an ID to play a given 
role (yes to RQ2), but this role has not been played effectively (no to RQ3), shown as 
S7. In addition, S3 implies no reasonableness gap and S5 and S6 imply no 
performance gap, while S1 and S4 are unlikely to happen. The responses on RQ4 and 
the opinions from the two regulators are integrated into the analysis of the causes of 
expectations gaps. We follow this framework and analyse each role in turn.  
The summarized views and quotations from the interviews are used in the 
analysis as empirical evidence. In addition, three statistical tests are undertaken to 
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examine the existence of the expectations gaps: the one sample Chi-square test of 
whether the different types of opinion are statistically different; the Kruskal-Wallis 
test undertaken to investigate whether the opinions of the three groups of interviewees 
are statistically different; and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test used to compare the 
opinions of the paired IDs and EDs.  
=================== 
Insert Fig.1 about here  
=================== 
5.1 The control role  
5.1.1 Is the control role desirable? 
Section 1 of Table 2 shows that in total 23 out of 26 interviewees agreed that 
they would expect IDs to play a control role. A statistically significant Chi-square test 
(X2 = 15.385, Sig.=0.000) indicates a high consensus on the desirability of the control 
role. Consistently, the Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon tests do not show that the 
opinions among the three groups and between the paired IDs and EDs are 
significantly different.  
This consensus is consistent with the regulators’ emphasis on the control role 
(CSRC, 2001; 2002). Many interviewees also provided further comments on this role. 
For example, RL1 stated: “This is the main role an ID is expected to play”. Some 
interviewees valued the existence of IDs as “a voice from the outside” (e.g., ED2, 
ID2), and expected that “IDs could help reduce risk by restricting diversified 
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investment and increasing information transparency on related party transactions” 
(e.g., II6, ID4, ID6). 
=================== 
Insert Table 2 about here  
=================== 
Despite the above consensus, the interviews revealed mixed views over the 
objectives of exercising control. The Code (CSRC, 2002) emphasizes the interests of 
minority shareholders, but this focus was frequently questioned by the interviewees. 
Seven out of nine IDs stated that they should represent the interests of the 
company and ensure compliance with the regulatory guidelines. “I have never thought 
that IDs’ role is to protect small shareholders. I am here, as a director, to represent the 
interests of all shareholders”, ID4 said. This echoes the finding by NG and Roberts 
(2007) that IDs help sustain the continuation of the family-controlled Singaporean firm 
rather than protecting the minority interest (p.305). Some IDs and IIs expressed 
particular concerns about the conflict of interest between minority shareholders and 
company’s long-term development, and argued that a focus on the interests of small 
shareholders might promote opportunistic behaviour and be harmful to all listed 
companies at large. The following comments made by ID8 were typical: 
“The ubiquitous practice in the Chinese capital market is that the current 
shareholders (including small ones) intend to manipulate share price 
movements. They have a blueprint of share price movement in mind and try 
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to force the board to take this blueprint as the objective of decision-making. 
Usually this means maximizing current shareholders’ wealth and harming 
the company’s long-term development, because the majority of investors in 
China only focus on short-term interests”. 
RL2, an official from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, explained that the reason 
for emphasizing the protection of minority shareholders’ interest was due to the 
highly concentrated ownership structure in the 1990s when listed companies were 
usually dominated by one large state shareholder. In the process of ownership 
structure reform, the regulators have begun to realize that this focus has also created 
problems and therefore they are attempting to change the focus so that IDs represent 
all shareholders’ interests. Such an attempt is being made through informal discussion 
instead of formal amendments to regulation (e.g., Zou, 2006).  
However, this finding is inconsistent with the concerns over the Type II 
agency problem expressed in previous studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2010; Young et al., 
2008). The interviewees’ above comments, especially those from the regulator, seem 
to suggest that the Type II agency problem has been overemphasized.  
5.1.2 Perceived reasonableness of the control role  
In light of the inconsistent understanding of the objectives of ID’s control role, 
the fact the ID mechanism is still new, the poor quality of the law and law 
enforcement, is it reasonable to expect IDs to play a control role? Consistent with the 
consensus regarding the desirableness of the control role, there is a certain extent of 
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agreement on the reasonableness of IDs’ control role. As shown in Section 2 of Table 
2, 15 out of 26 interviewees considered it reasonable or very reasonable. A 
statistically significant Chi-square test (X2 = 2.90, Sig.=0.088) indicates a high 
consensus on the reasonableness of the control role.. Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis 
and Wilcoxon tests show statistically insignificant results. Comparing to the 
consensus on the desirability of this role, this fits into scenario3 (S3 in Fig.1). Thus, 
no obvious reasonableness gap is observed for the control role. 
The interviewees suggested three main reasons for their support of the control 
role. First, this is the role defined by the regulation, and the main motive for 
introducing the ID mechanism to China (e.g. ED2, ID5, II4). Second, IDs have been 
given the right to vote on important decisions and therefore should be able to exercise 
their control role (e.g., IIs1, 4, ED5, IDs1, 2, 4, 8, 9 & 10). Finally, IDs have the 
independent status to do so (ED5). This finding is consistent with Reay’s (1994) 
survey in the British context, in which IDs’ “watchdog” role is supported by 
institutional investors.   
5.1.3 Perceived effectiveness of the IDs’ control role  
As shown in Section 3 of Table 2, of the 26 respondents, seven voted “very 
effective” or “effective”, ten remained neutral, while nine voted “ineffective” or “very 
ineffective”. The Chi-square test indicates no significant difference. Compared with 
the consensus on the reasonableness of the control role, this lack of evidence on 
effectiveness fits into scenario 7 (S7 in Fig.1) and suggests the existence of a 
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performance gap for the control role. Furthermore, none of the IIs considered the 
control role of IDs as being effective or very effective, as compared to four IDs and 
three EDs who responded favourably. The Kruskal-Wallis test reveals a significant 
difference in the opinions of the three groups (X2 = 9.026, Sig.=0.011) while the 
Wilcoxon test illustrates insignificant results. This suggests a more pronounced 
performance gap for outsiders (IIs) than for insiders (IDs and EDs). This lack of 
evidence on effectiveness is consistent with the many exposed corporate scandals 
(Chen et al., 2010) and the findings of Liu and Lu (2004), but contradicts the 
implications of the findings in China from previous studies of the relationship 
between ID characteristics and firm performance (e.g., Peng, 2004; Firth et al., 2006; 
Chen and Lin, 2007).  
5.1.4 Factors that affected the effectiveness of the control role and 
resultant performance gap  
The first factor emerging from the interviews is a lack of clear definition of the 
control role. This can be illustrated by an interesting case involving ID2. The 
company where he served failed to disclose a large amount of loss from an investment 
project in its annual report in 2005, and he had to pay a fine of RMB ￥50,000 as a 
punishment imposed by the CSRC because he was aware of the fraud but did not raise 
it in IDs’ report. He appealed successfully on the basis that he had tried to use his 
social contacts to help the company reduce the loss as soon as he became aware of the 
problem, and that his heart was at the right place. RL1, an official from Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, commented that: “We do not expect him to collect the bad debts. His 
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priority should be to ensure proper information disclosure”. However, the signal 
released by the successful appeal contradicts his comment, and this conflict reflects 
the ambiguity on the understanding of the control role.  
The second factor is IDs’ lack of independence and objectivity. As many IDs are 
nominated by controlling shareholders, they are criticised as “interpreters of majority 
shareholders” (ED1). ED1 illustrated this point by offering the following example. 
His company had a proposal for taking over another company. The controlling 
shareholder, the government, initially agreed, so did IDs. However, the controlling 
shareholder changed its mind later. IDs simply supported the change without 
enquiring into or challenging it. Thus, ED1 questioned “where is “the objectivity of 
IDs’ opinion?” The lack of objectivity of IDs is reinforced by the effect of Chinese 
culture. “I would feel respected by being invited as an ID, therefore, I would respect 
you in return: trying to support your proposals.”(ED8). This point is also made by 
Liu and Lu (2004). 
The third factor is IDs’ insufficient time-input. “The IDs do not have the time to 
gain an insight into the company’s operating processes and activities. I even doubt if 
they would have the time to read the materials provided to them, let alone further 
enquiries or investigations”(ED2). Contrary to previous studies (e.g., Shen, 2005), no 
ID complained about financial compensation, but felt that their time input was so little 
that they could not exercise their expected roles effectively.   
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Finally, the incompetence of IDs hinders the exercise of the control role. Both 
IDs 2 & 9 estimated that only 50 percent of the current IDs were competent. One 
typical example was given by ED8 and ID8 in Company 8 where there were three IDs 
in their company, but only ID8 was regarded as competent. The other two IDs just 
followed whatever ID8 intended to do. 
5.1.5 The reasons for a more significant performance gap in IDs’ control 
role from IIs’ perspective 
Section 5.1.3 shows that IIs have a more negative perception of the 
effectiveness of IDs’ control role compared with IDs and EDs. The interview data 
revealed two contributors. First, the communication and probing before the board 
meeting were invisible. All IDs interviewed acknowledged that they exchanged ideas 
informally with EDs before board meetings and formal pre-board meetings. ED9 
described how it worked: “You rarely see any disagreement in annual reports. All 
have been sorted out before the BoD meetings. If no agreement upon a proposal could 
be reached, the proposal would not appear at the BoD meeting. It would be given up 
or discussed in the future.”  Under such circumstances, the IDs’ efforts would not be 
observed by outsiders (e.g., IIs or other individual investors).5 Indeed, IIs complained 
that they had not seen many disclosed cases where IDs voted against proposals at 
board meetings.  
                                               
5
 Some outsiders may become less critical of IDs for not expending sufficient time on their ID jobs 
should they know the invisible nature of part of the work done by IDs. However, our interviewees, 
including the IDs, consider that IDs’ lack of time commitment is a general problem.   
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Second, there existed a strong distrust in IDs’ capability to play the control 
role. This is reflected in II5’s remarks: “It is common in China that corporate 
governance is not effective…Therefore, We would not consider IDs when we make 
investment decisions. We would only be alerted when the ID(s) of our invested 
company suddenly resign, because that usually signals a conflict of interest and the 
share price of that company could be expected to shift dramatically” (II7). None of 
the IIs interviewed put IDs as an important factor in their investment decision making. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that the control role is perceived to be necessary 
and reasonable but not performed effectively. The evidence suggests a performance 
gap, but no reasonableness gap, and the performance gap perceived by IIs is larger 
than that perceived by EDs and IDs. Moreover, contrary to the concerns on Type II 
agency problem raised by prior studies, the data revealed that such concerns may not 
be warranted. 
5.2 The strategic role  
5.2.1 Should IDs play a strategic role?   
As shown in Section 1 of Table 3, a large majority of interviewees (21 out of 246) 
agreed that IDs should play a strategic role. This tendency is supported by the 
Chi-square test (X2 = 13.500, Sig. = 0.000). Moreover, this consensus also existed in 
                                               
6
 As two IIs did not comment on the strategic role, the total number of interviewees in the analysis is 
reduced from 26 to 24.  
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each of the three interview groups as no significant difference was shown by the 
Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon tests.  
There are no particular stated requirements in the Code and Guidelines (CSRC 
2001; 2002) regarding the strategic role. The attitudes of interviewed regulators were 
neutral, taking the view that this role is a good supplement, but not a compulsory one. 
“We did not say IDs should not play a strategic role, but the control role should be 
their main focus” (RL1). “We expect that they involve more in strategic management 
process in the future when IDs become more competent.” (RL2).  
During the course of our interviews, the most commonly referred reason for 
IDs to play a strategic role was that “an ID firstly is a director and shares the same 
responsibility with executive directors” (e.g., IDs 1, 2 & 9, EDs 2, 3 & 4). IDs 1 & 10 
stated that participating in strategic decision making was important for protecting 
minority shareholders’ interests. However, other interviewees stated that the main 
responsibility of IDs is not to make strategic decisions but to participate in decision 
making processes in the capacity of an adviser or a specialist (e.g., EDs 2, 3 & 9; IDs 
1, 6 & 8; IIs 2, 3, 4, 5 & 8). Moreover, EDs expect IDs to provide advice on strategic 
issues not just for firms’ performance improvement but also for their career risk 
management. ED3 made the following comments: 
“The presence of IDs in the decision-making process would actually help 
protect the managers. In case something goes wrong, the manager can 
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indicate that he/she has followed all the procedures and consulted the IDs 
as expected and hence, she/he will not be penalised for the loss”. 
This viewpoint received broad support from other EDs we interviewed. It 
provides evidence in the Chinese context for Brennan’s (2006) view that directors 
may not necessarily take shareholder value as their first priority.  
5.2.2 Reasonableness of the strategic role 
There was also an overall consensus on the reasonableness of the strategic role 
(18 out of 24 interviewees considered it as being reasonable or very reasonable). This 
is supported by the Chi-square test (X2 = 19.75, Sig.=0.000). Moreover, the 
Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon tests show no significant differences in the opinions of 
the three groups and between the paired IDs and EDs. Integrating the results from 
Section 5.2.1, the overall evidence fits into scenario 3 (S3 in Fig.1): no obvious 
reasonableness gap is observed regarding the strategic role. 
As most listed companies choose their IDs from accountants or 
industry-specific specialists, it is reasonable to expect IDs to provide professional 
advice to help companies’ development (e.g., EDs 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6, IDs 2 & 8, IIs 2 & 4). 
Some IDs thought that getting involved in the strategic decision making process was 
an important way to exercise monitoring and control (IDs 2, 3 & 4). In addition, a 
strategic advisory role would appear to be less likely to cause tension between EDs 
and IDs compared to exercising the control role in the Chinese cultural context (RL1).  
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5.2.3 Perceived effectiveness of the strategic role  
Section 3 of Table 3 reveals diverging opinions on the effectiveness of the 
strategic role: eight interviewees voted “very effective” or “effective”, but ten 
interviewees voted “very ineffective” or “ineffective”. The remaining six interviewees 
remained neutral. The Chi-square test indicates no significant difference. There is no 
evidence to suggest a difference among the three groups and between IDs and EDs as 
neither the Kruskal-Wallis test nor the Wilcoxon test revealed significant results. This 
result does not provide evidence that IDs played an effective strategic role, illustrating 
the existence of a performance gap (S7 in Fig.1).   
Apart from the shortage of time-input by IDs, another contributing factor lies 
in the fact that many IDs do not possess specific industry and business knowledge, 
which is essential for strategic participation. RL2 remarked: “The majority of the IDs 
in listed companies are academics. There is a shortage of candidates with experience 
in industries”, a point echoed by many other interviewees (e.g., EDs 2, 3, 5, 9; IDs 4, 
6, 8 & 9; IIs 1, 4 & 5; RL 1). 
In summary, while our interviewees considered the strategic role desirable and 
reasonable, they focused the strategic role on advice and participation rather than 
decision-making. This is consistent with the findings by Huse (2005) and Rindova 
(1999). However, there is little evidence to suggest that Chinese IDs performed the 
strategic role effectively. 
5.3 The resource provision role 
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5.3.1 Desirability, reasonableness and effectiveness of the resource provision role 
Table 4 shows that the perceptions on the resource provision role are much 
more diverse compared to those on the control and strategic roles. Section 1 of Table 
4 reveals that 12 interviewees responded “no”, ten “yes” and four “no comments” 
when asked whether IDs should play a resource provision role. As shown in Section 2 
of Table 4, eight out of 18 interviewees expressed a negative opinion whereas eight 
others were positive about the reasonableness of this role. Section 3 of Table 4 shows 
that seven interviewees considered the resource provision role ineffective or very 
ineffective, six interviewees were positive, and five remained neutral. The Chi-square, 
Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon tests provide no significant results on the desirability, 
reasonableness and effectives of the resource provision role. This indicates that there 
is no consensus on the three dimensions of the role and there is no significant opinion 
difference among the three groups, and the two pair groups, of interviewees. Hence, 
the overall evidence is inconclusive about the existence of either a reasonableness gap 
or a performance gap. 
The observation of favourable and unfavourable responses further shed light 
on this diversity. For example, while some interviewees thought IDs’ reputation and 
resources could ensure investors’ confidence and support companies’ development 
(e.g., ID10 ED3, II2), some thought that this role might have ruined IDs’ reputation 
(e.g., ID6, ID2). To support the latter, ID6 stated: “When an ID possesses special 
access to certain resources, especially government resources, this might motivate the 
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company to rely on this advantage and not to focus on the development of its 
competitive advantage.” 
5.3.2 Reasons for the lack of consensus over, and willingness to acknowledge the 
performance of the resource provision role 
Although the above evidence was inconclusive, all interviewees valued the 
resource contribution of IDs in terms of their expertise. As accountants, lawyers, 
industry specialists, or managers, IDs were considered to have provided valuable 
advice in such areas as internal control, taxation, macro-economic issues, government 
policy and strategic planning.  
Although “Guanxi” has been regarded as an important characteristic of Chinese 
culture, the interviewees were reluctant to acknowledge the contributions from IDs’ 
social contacts, especially those related to government resources. The EDs tried to 
make an impression that the resource role was an added bonus. For example, “having 
resources is better than not having any” (ED8), or “it is not a critical factor in the 
nomination of an ID, but if other things are equal, having a resource role is not a bad 
thing” (ED2).  
The EDs and IIs tended to view the use of social contacts for improving firm 
performance negatively, perhaps because usually this resource only works in the 
short-term and may signal the lack of self-development ability in the long-term. The 
IDs’ reluctance might also be related to “face value - Mianzi” (Chen, 2003) in the 
sense that the benefits from social contacts might be seen as advantages gained from 
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unfair competition. According to some interviewees, people tend to think that some 
IDs are appointed purely because of their social contacts, implying that IDs are not 
really competent or qualified in their field of expertise (e.g., ID8 and II7). 
Consequently, interviewees were more willing to discuss their contributions from 
their expertise. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has explored whether there is a reasonableness gap and a performance 
gap in IDs’ control, strategic and resource provision roles in a Chinese context. The 
overall evidence suggests a performance gap, but no reasonableness gap in the control 
and strategic roles. The performance gap can be attributed to several factors including 
the ill-defined roles, IDs’ limited time commitment, and their lack of industry and 
business knowledge, competence, and objectivity. Interestingly, these impediments 
are in line with Brennan’s (2006) findings based on a literature review.7 
While our investigation has focused on internal factors, we recognise that the 
limited role performed by IDs may also be due to external factors. In general, 
corporate governance is relatively new in China, the legal system is far from being 
perfect, shareholder protection is under-developed, and independent and government 
monitoring mechanisms such as auditing and securities watchdogs are weak. If mega 
                                               
7
 However, Brennan (2006) considers lack of clarity and agreement on the role of boards as a 
contributor to reasonableness gaps while our interviewees regarded it as a contributor to performance 
gap.   
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corporate frauds and corporate governance failures could occur in developed markets, 
it is no surprise that IDs can be less effective than expected in China. In a weak 
corporate governance environment, even truly independent directors would find it 
difficult to exercise their roles effectively. The introduction of IDs in China is new. 
Experiences in developed countries such as the UK show that it takes time to develop 
their roles. Moreover, the effectiveness of IDs may have been affected by path 
dependence (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). This is evident from the fact that Chinese IDs 
are usually appointed by controlling shareholders who are likely either government 
agencies or other SOEs. Not only does this threaten IDs’ independence, but it also 
introduces non-economic objectives and reinforces Type II agency problems. 
This does not mean that nothing can be done to improve IDs’ performance. To 
the contrary, the above identified specific reasons for IDs’ underperformance indicate 
issues that should be addressed and suggest measures to be taken to make IDs’ roles 
more effective. Our findings indicate a need to define IDs’ roles clearly. Given that 
the control and strategic roles are considered desirable and reasonable, it is useful to 
provide specific guidance as to how such roles can be effectively exercised.  
There is also a need to enhance IDs’ competence and commitment. Indeed, 
Chinese authorities have already taken many measures. For example, the CSRC 
requires IDs to complete a training course, pass a formal test prior to appointment, be 
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retrained at least once within one appointment period, and spend no fewer than 10 
days to undertake field studies in the companies they serve.8  
We also found no consensus on the desirability, reasonableness and 
effectiveness of IDs’ resource provision role despite wide acknowledgement of the 
provision of professional expertise by the IDs and some anecdotal evidence of the 
provision of social capital to the firms that IDs serve. We discovered that one of the 
important reasons for the under-appreciation of IDs’ performance of this role is the 
pejorative connotation of ‘Guanxi’. This may also be because the exercise of this role 
could counteract the effort of the CSRC to curb the rampant related party transactions 
and its effort to keep listed firms separate from their parent companies, large 
shareholders, and government. This finding suggests a cultural dimension to IDs’ 
corporate governance roles, which echoes the call for further research into informal, 
soft elements of corporate governance in emerging economies (Young et al., 2008). 
It is particularly interesting that many of our interviewees disagreed with the 
traditional view that the objective of IDs’ control role is to protect minority investors. 
They argued that to do so may harm the long-term interests of all shareholders given 
the highly speculative nature of minority shareholders in China. This view also 
implies that government as majority shareholders is less speculative and proxies for 
the firm’s long term wealth creation, not to say the public interest and hence there is 
                                               
8
 In contrast, all directors in the UK should receive induction on joining the board and regularly 
update their skills and knowledge (FRC, 2010).  
 32
room for it to play a positive role in corporate governance.9 However, this view 
contradicts the abounding evidence in the literature which shows the existence of 
many principal-principal conflicts of interest (Aharony et al., 2010; Young et al., 
2008). Some interviewees also criticised IDs as representatives of controlling 
shareholders, implying the existence of such conflicts. Further research is needed to 
ascertain the nature of the debate.  
Interviewing several different groups of interviewees has enabled us to 
identify some significant and interesting perception differences among the groups and 
trace some causes of the differences. For example, we find that IIs perceived a larger 
performance gap with respect to the control role than the other groups of interviewees 
mainly because some activities of IDs are not easily observable by outsiders and 
because IIs have little regard for corporate governance in general and the role of IDs 
in it in particular.  
While our study helps remedy a significant and unfortunate void in the 
literature, it is explorative in nature, based on a dataset collected through a small 
non-random sample of IDs, EDs, IIs and regulators. A replication using a random, 
larger and more comprehensive sample would help confirm our findings and 
overcome the limitations of our small and convenience sample. Furthermore, although 
our findings indicate certain measures that could be taken to enhance the effectiveness 
                                               
9
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
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of IDs’ roles, it would be useful to undertake a specific study to systematically chart 
the problems of IDs’ underperformance and their causes and to identify a 
comprehensive set of remedies. Finally, it may be interesting to extend our study in 
other contexts, especially in other emerging markets.  
 
Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
Company:  
Position: 
For how long have you worked in the company? 
For how long have you worked on the current position?  
Qualifications:  
Gender:  
Section One(Two/Three): Control Role (Strategic Role /Resource Provision Role) 
Q1. Do you think that IDs should play a control role (strategic role/resource provision 
role)? Why? 
Q2. Under the current circumstances, to what extent do you think it is reasonable to 
expect IDs to fulfil the control role (strategic role/resource provision role)? Why? 
Q3. To what extent do you think IDs have played the control role (strategic 
role/resource provision role) effectively? 
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Q4. What factors facilitate or impede IDs in the execution of the control role 
(strategic role/resource provision role)? Please provide examples. 
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